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Summary
In the rapid transition to net zero, demand is likely to exceed supply for three zero-emissions 
resources: non-emitting electricity, biomass and negative emissions. ZERPAs are a new financial 
instrument that allow capital markets to anticipate this shortage, evaluate risks and redirect capital 
in response.
which will anticipate resource constraints and stimulate 
responses by investment, substitution or restraint. Finance 
providers – banks, investors, insurers and asset managers – 
can improve their climate resilience by demanding ZERPA-
backed net zero transition plans.
ZERPAs are 15 to 30 year purchasing contracts that 
guarantee future resource prices. Resource users agree to 
pay a set price for future resource supply in exchange for 
market priority during shortages and proof of carbon-free 
procurement. Contracts will be tradeable on an exchange, 
with separate contracts for each resource.  
ZERPAs would provide certainty and influence both the 
supply and demand sides of resource markets. On the 
supply side, they will stimulate investment in capacity, 
building on the UK government’s Contracts for Differences 
for non-emitting electricity. On the demand side, ZERPAs 
will credibly signal companies’ climate commitments and 
support financial risk management. ZERPAs will: 
• Reveal the likelihood of future aggregate resource 
constraints.
• Generate a market mechanism to allocate future 
resources to users that value them most.
• Support growth of zero emissions resource production 
by offering price security. 
Now is the time to develop mechanisms to protect future 
resource markets and increase the climate resilience of 
our finance providers. Government should work with the 
finance sector and regulators to consider using ZERPAs to 
support the key pillars of its net zero transition.
Like-for-like substitution of emitting activities depends on 
three fundamental zero emissions resources: non-emitting 
electricity, biomass and negative emissions. For example, 
an airline targeting net zero can: switch to electric planes 
or synthetic fuels, requiring non-emitting electricity; use 
bio-kerosene requiring biomass; continue to use fossil-
fuels but cancel their effect through negative emissions 
technologies. Other forms of service substitution are 
possible, for example through remote connections, but 
direct replacement always depends on the three zero 
emissions resources.
As governments and corporates announce plans for their 
transition to net zero there is currently no mechanism 
to confirm sufficient supply of these crucial resources. 
At present 17% of the world’s primary energy comes 
from non-emitting electricity and biomass, humans 
already appropriate a high proportion of around 30% of 
global biomass harvest and global capacity for negative 
emissions is less than 0.1% of annual emissions caused 
by humans.1 It is therefore likely that demand will soon 
exceed supply. This creates a significant risk to plans for 
climate safety, which translates into a risk for providers of 
finance: if corporates fail to deliver on net zero promises, 
they will in time be restricted by changing demand and 
by regulation. Credible plans to secure the resources 
necessary for the net zero transitions reduces risks of 
missing climate targets.
This paper proposes the development of Zero Emissions 
Resource Procurement Agreements (ZERPAs), a new 
financial instrument to address these risk. They provide a 
mechanism to distinguish rhetoric from commitment in 
corporate net zero planning. They will operate in a market 
Figure 1: Key takeaways for each stakeholder group
Resource constraints impose systemic risks on future business models that are currently unpriced in capital 
markets. ZERPAs provide companies more secure access to zero emissions resources and increase the 
credibility of corporate net zero transition plans. 
ZERPAs would extend and expand current support for zero emissions resource production, and ease barriers 
to investment capital. 
Corporate strategies must account for future zero emissions resource constraints. ZERPAs will signal to 
customers and providers of nance where climate strategies are credible. 
 
National net zero transition will put extreme pressure on resource markets. Constraints could have 
signicant economic, distributional, environmental and competitiveness implications. ZERPAs allow nancial 
markets to better allocate and ensure the development of scarce resources, supporting net zero. 
  
Evaluating aggregate risks requires pricing company-level risks and constraints. ZERPAs will help to reveal 
aggregate constraints for zero emissions resources, reducing the chances of asset price collapse and the 
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1.Context: Future resource constraints 
The financial sector is rapidly adopting practices to limit climate financial risks. Efforts are largely 
focused on the disclosure of climate-related financial risks based on individual companies’ 
vulnerability to climate impacts or stress testing banks and institutions for their portfolio exposure.2 
However, these practices do not generally account for aggregate risks of market-wide resource 
shortages.  
1.1. Aggregate resource constraints 
Today, many of the goods we consume, services we 
procure and activities we enjoy generate emissions. Three 
broad abatement strategies can deliver the transition to 
net zero:
1. Exercising restraint, for example by reducing 
consumption to avoid energy use. 
2. Attaining the same outcomes differently, for example 
replacing business travel with virtual communication.
3. Delivering goods, services and activities with 
alternative technologies that draw on three zero 
emissions resources: non-emitting electricity, biomass 
and negative emissions.
UK and international climate strategies currently rely 
largely on the third of these strategies. Non-emitting 
electricity refers to variable renewables, such as solar 
and wind generation, along with firm nuclear power. 
Biomass is any organic matter, which can be used in 
energy generation (bioenergy), transport (biofuels), or as 
a material (fibre or timber).3 Negative emissions refers to 
the removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. It 
may be direct removals, for example if fossil fuel electricity 
generation, conventional cement production or existing 
blast furnace technologies are coupled with the negative 
emissions technology of carbon capture and storage (CCS).4 
It can also be indirect, for example if natural or man-mad 
carbon sinks such as forests and peatlands are enhanced, 
or via novel technological processes that directly capture 
carbon from the air and store it4.  Non-emitting electricity 
and negative emissions technologies can also be used 
to produce zero emissions hydrogen. Hydrogen, often 
proposed as a key pillar of future net zero economies, is 
a derived resource which relies on robust markets for the 
three critical zero emissions resources.
The next three decades will see demand for these three 
zero emissions resources increase significantly, putting 
growing pressure on supply. Figure 2 shows the share 
of projected 2050 resource demand which could be met 
by today’s resource markets and the mid-term supply 
projections for 2035. 
 
 
The UK government has set targets to increase the supply 
of zero emissions resources over the next three decades.3,6.
Whether these targets are achievable depends on the rate 
of deployment of non-emitting electricity and negative 
emissions technologies, and the sustainable production 
of biomass. Each resource faces its own barriers. Non-
emitting electricity and negative emissions have vast 
technological and infrastructure needs. Biomass requires 
careful sourcing to avoid infringing on the use of crops 
for food and the protection of other species’ natural 
environments.7
Developing and deploying new technologies requires 
investment, clear policy guidance, and—crucially—time. 
Large-scale energy transitions in the past have generally 
taken several decades8,9, constrained by political and social 
factors and the immense construction requirements10. 
Figure 3 shows the annual build rates required between 
now and 2050 for five non-emitting technologies, 
compared to what is being built today.
Required build rates are significantly higher than recent 
and current activity. Government support mechanisms 
can accelerate the delivery of new technologies: in 2017, 






2020 supply           Projected 2035 supply
Share of projected 2050 demand (%)
Figure 2: Zero emissions resource supply as a share of projected 
2050 demand. Data sourced from CCC4 and BEIS5, based on the 
CCC’s Balanced Net Zero Pathway. Biomass includes biogas, 
biofuels, biowaste and imports.
The fundamental problem that this report addresses is 
that there is currently no mechanism for evaluating the 
aggregate implications of individual decisions or plans in 
the context of future resource constraints. 
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2.6GW of onshore wind was installed as developers rushed 
to make use of government funding for renewables.12 
Progress has since slowed and existing incentives are 
currently insufficient to achieve the UK’s generation 
targets. The ambition-achievement gap is particularly 
stark for solar power, carbon capture and hydrogen.
Policy approach for aggregate constraints
The UK government has not yet addressed the risk of future 
aggregate resource constraints. Despite growing evidence 
that the limited supply of zero emissions resources 
may constrain the UK economy in the coming decades, 
the government has proposed only two meaningful 
strategies to deal with them: investment in battery storage 
technology and demand side response to accommodate 
intermittent renewable generation. While both options 
are essential for supporting the transition to a low-carbon 
electricity grid, neither account for the potential for long-
term constraints across all zero emissions resources. 
1.2. Allocating capital for net zero 
The financial sector facilitates net zero through project 
financing and capital allocation. Project financing provides 
the up-front capital required for large-scale energy 
investments such as developing low-carbon generation. 
Capital allocation provides funds to companies in the 
form of equity investments via share purchases and debt 
finance from banks. A climate finance transition has 
begun. For example, project financing is adjusting to the 
carbon-constrained future, with investors demanding 
higher returns for carbon-intensive energy projects.13 Most 
finance providers in the UK will be required to disclose 
climate portfolio risks from 2023.14 
The financial sector signals perceived constraints, 
opportunities and risks in markets through the allocation 
of capital. Climate risks are generally evaluated based on 
companies’ net zero transition plans. However, at present 
these are not easily comparable nor are they usually 
supported with practicable strategies.15 The movement 
towards climate financial disclosure will therefore evolve 
to require demonstratable mechanisms to ‘prove’ the 
veracity of climate plans. Finance providers, including 
investors, asset managers, banks and insurers, could then 
more easily evaluate and ameliorate the climate exposure 
of their investment portfolios. 
Credible signals of intent must incorporate aggregate 
market forces. For example, airlines propose reaching net 
zero using significant quantities of biomass.16 However, the 
total supply of biomass in the UK and globally is limited 
by sustainability and biodiversity concerns. In the face of 
competition with other users, it is unlikely that all airlines 
will be able to secure sufficient biomass to achieve their 
proclaimed net zero pathways. 
A mechanism that enables companies to secure future 
access to zero emissions resource requirements would 
enable long-run forecasts of aggregate market demand 
and supply. This would reveal systemic risks to the financial 
system and wider macroeconomy. 
Timescale of risk 
Climate change operates on a scale of decades and 
centuries. This is beyond the business cycle, political 
cycle, and the regulatory oversight of most authorities. 
For example, one stakeholder highlighted the limited 
timescale of electricity regulators, who consider scarcity 
only on four year timeframe, because that is the period 
necessary to build a new natural gas generator. Mark 
Carney, the UN special envoy for climate action and 
finance, refers to this as the ‘tragedy of the horizon’17:  
The catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt 
beyond the traditional horizons of most actors – imposing a 
cost on future generations that the current generation has 
no direct incentive to fix. 
- Mark Carney, 2015
Addressing resource constraints, achieving efficient 
capital allocation and utilising tomorrow’s commercial 
opportunities requires looking past a two to five year 
investment horizon to consider the next three decades 
of economic transformation. Financing decisions today 
will affect long-run markets, particularly for sectors which 
change slowly. Farsighted investments are essential in 
addressing the long-term systemic risks of climate change: 
shareholders and investors will face precipitous losses in a 
>2ºC future. Finance providers therefore have significant 
influence in mitigating long-term climate financial risk and 
with the right mechanisms in place will find commercial 
rewards from improved foresight. 









Run rate (GW/MtCO2/MtH2 per year)
Required rate Current rate
Figure 3: Construction requirements of net zero. Run rate 
refers to annual capacity additions. Requirements based on 
CCC forecast and analysis from Atkins.11
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2. Proposal: ZERPA markets
This report proposes a new market-based mechanism to allocate future resources efficiently, using 
Zero Emissions Resource Procurement Agreements (ZERPAs). ZERPAs will price future zero emissions 
resource supply, reveal scarcity prices and highlight aggregate constraints on future resource use.
ZERPAs use prices to generate credible market signals. 
Resources prices reflect the balance of supply and demand 
and the expectation of future market conditions. Primary 
ZERPAs set long-run prices and are similar to Contracts for 
Difference (CfDs), the UK government’s existing mechanism 
to support renewable energy projects. When a company 
purchases a secondary ZERPA, they receive the contract’s 
delivery promise and take on the contractual obligation 
to pay the agreed strike price. Secondary ZERPAs allow 
private companies to secure their supply of zero emissions 
resources, hedge prices, and signal their net zero strategy 
to increasingly climate-aware finance providers. 
ZERPAs will replace existing mechanisms for long-run 
resource allocation, which focus on supply in the non-
emitting electricity market. This misses two points: first, 
they do not incorporate demand for zero emissions 
resources. Second, industries which cannot be electrified 
will require alternative resources: biomass or negative 
emissions. ZERPAs address these gaps. Unlike CfDs, they 
utilise both demand and supply signals to reveal future 
market conditions. They are available for all zero emissions 
resources, and over the entire period to the net zero 2050 
target. Finally, they will be standardised and facilitated 
by an intermediary, so available to many different market 
participants – not just large users, like the complex Power 
Purchasing Agreements (PPAs) used to set long-run 
electricity prices in the private sector. Section 4.3 compares 
specific features of ZERPAs to existing mechanisms. 
The remainder of this section provides more detail on the 
primary and secondary ZERPA markets. It then discusses 
potential structures of ZERPAs for each type of resource; the 
role of the intermediary; market implications. Additionally, 
a case study in the steel sector is presented, developed in 
collaboration with ArcelorMittal. The following sections 
use several key price terms: 
• ZERPA strike price: Constant price for long-
run delivery of resources under ZERPA contract, 
determined in primary ZERPA auction, for per unit 
delivery of resources.  
• ZERPA contract price: Variable cost of purchasing a 
secondary ZERPA contract from the central exchange. 
The ZERPA contract batch price refers to the price of 
the entire project; the ZERPA contract unit price refers 
to the (expected) average p/kWh for that project.
• Wholesale spot price: Variable spot price for 
resources on the wholesale market. 
• ZERPA top up: Variable difference between the 
wholesale spot price and the strike price.
2.1. Primary ZERPAs: Allocating 
contracts in resource auctions
The primary market will facilitate long-run contracting 
with zero emissions resource producers by building on 
current CfD auction mechanisms. These auctions will be 
facilitated by an intermediary: either a government agency 
or a commercial exchange (the role of the intermediary 
is discussed in Section 4.4). ZERPA contracts will then be 
accredited based on the likelihood of contract realisation. 
ZERPA auctions will have three key differences to CfD 
auctions:
1. Expanded scope: ZERPAs can be allocated for any 





auction for primary ZERPA 










Buys ZERPA on secondary 




Figure 4: Primary and secondary ZERPA contracts
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2. Distant commissioning dates: For example, a 
producer might place a bid for delivery beginning in 
10 years. Such contracts would support innovation 
and infrastructure planning. 
3. Stricter financial pre-qualifications: A charge will 
be collected at time of bidding, which is forfeited if the 
producer fails to deliver a contract. Such charges have 
been shown to increase the realisation of contracted 
projects.18
4. Technologically neutral: CfDs are generally allocated 
only to technologies for which the government wishes 
to catalyse a market—more mature technologies, 
including solar and onshore wind, have been excluded 
from past CfD auctions. ZERPAs will be technologically 
neutral.
For producers, primary ZERPAs offer a way to derisk 
revenue streams by setting a guaranteed price far into 
the future. This will reduce barriers to project investment, 
which can be challenging without price security. As one 
energy investment expert put it, the dearth of long-run 
contracts means “there is a large amount of low cost 
capital that is essentially sitting on the sidelines”. For 
renewable generators, particularly those utilising mature 
technologies, one of the core business challenges is 
finding cheap capital for investment. Long-run ZERPAs will 
address this problem. 
 
Derisking revenue is very appealing, and would allow us to 
access lower cost of capital. 
– Stakeholder, Ørsted
Accreditation
After contracting, an independent accreditation 
intermediary will verify and rate contracts based on the 
probability that the project will be realised. Accreditation 
can build on existing methods for project finance 
evaluation19 and pre-generation checks under CfD, such 
as the requirement for a 10% capital investment within 
a year of contracting.20 Pre-generation checks will be 
more complex for the ZERPA mechanism due to long 
commissioning dates. The same principles can nonetheless 
be applied. 
Once resource production begins, the accreditation 
agency will allocate ZERPA certificates for each unit sold. 
Similar certification is undertaken today by Ofgem, for the 
Renewable Energy Guarantees of Origin (REGO) scheme. 
ZERPA certificates will be crucial for the secondary ZERPA 
market. 
Primary ZERPA market
Participants Resource producers, ZERPA contract intermediary, accreditation intermediary
Mechanism Sealed bid pay-as-clear auction, resource certification
Timing Regular, scheduled auctions with frequency set to meet demand
Contrcts Primary ZERPA between resource producer and intermediary
Price ZERPA strike price
Price determinants
Wholesale spot price expectations.
Estimated levelised cost of resource.
Risk Management
Accreditation of producers/bids by accreditor
Contract design includes physical and financial pre-qualifications
Table 1: Features of the primary ZERPA market
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2.2. Secondary ZERPAs: Reselling 
contracts to private users  
After each auction round, the intermediary will issue 
secondary ZERPAs to a central exchange. Secondary 
contracts will be linked to primary ZERPA allocation, but 
may be sold in smaller batches, for example separating 
the generation of one wind farm into many secondary 
contracts. The contracts can be purchased by users or 
investors at the ZERPA contract batch price. ZERPA holders 
are then obliged to pay the strike price for delivery of 
resource under the contract specifications. 
When a company purchases a secondary ZERPA they agree 
to pay the ZERPA top up, effectively hedging resource 
prices over the contract duration. ZERPAs also offers 
buyers: 
1. Priority market access: When resource constraints 
bind, contracted buyers will have priority access to a 
quantity equivalent to the contracted amount. 
2. ZERPA certificates: Trade will be verified using 
certificates as the virtual procurement vehicle. Trading 
electronic certificates requires no additional delivery 
infrastructure.
Once issued into the secondary market, ZERPAs can 
be continually traded in a central exchange, much like 
stocks. Trading reduces risks. Companies can resell their 
obligations if they no longer need the resources, instead 
of defaulting on the contract. While trading reduces 
the power of ZERPAs as a climate commitment signal (if 
companies can ‘trade out’ of ZERPA procurement), its risk-
reduction effect vastly increases the appeal for companies 
who may otherwise be hesitant to commit to long-run 
prices.
Secondary ZERPAs may be purchased by large resource 
users, such as industrial producers, for direct procurement. 
They may be purchased by demand-side intermediaries, 
who could subcontract to smaller companies or 
consumers for smaller quantities or shorter durations. Like 
electricity retailers or hedge funds, these risk-diversifying 
intermediaries will likely arise as a natural consequence of 
establishing a secondary ZERPA market. Trading offers a 
role for investors in the ZERPA market, who could provide 
liquidity to enable trading and price realisation.21
The secondary market price of ZERPAs as a 
unit of account
Shareholders can use ZERPAs to evaluate whether a 
company will be able to deliver on their climate strategies. 
This will support the allocation of capital towards 
genuinely climate-aligned firms and reduce the climate 
exposure of asset owners. Large funds and regulators can 
also use prices as aggregate signals of supply and demand 
for zero emissions resources. The contract price of ZERPAs 
on the secondary market will depend on the supply and 
demand for contracts. At a market level, these prices will 
Secondary ZERPA market
Participants Auction agency, ZERPA contract intermediary, resource users, investors
Mechanism Central exchange for secondary ZERPAs, ZERPA certificates.
Contract Secondary ZERPAs between resource user and intermediary
Price ZERPA contract price
Price determinants
Demand and supply in secondary ZERPA exchange. 
Wholesale prices and expectations.  
Risk management
Accreditation means riskier contracts will be cheaper. 
Technology risk potentially underwritten by government agency.
Market provides aggregation of potential energy futures.  
Table 2: Features of the primary ZERPA market
Table 1: Features of the primary ZERPA market
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also proxy future supply and demand for the resources 
themselves. When future resource demand is high, either 
due to economic forecasts or a desire to signal net zero 
compatibility, more companies will want to secure their 
supply arrangements using ZERPAs, pushing secondary 
contract prices up. Prices will act as a unit of account to 
signal future demand and supply. High ZERPA contract 
prices will indicate a risk of resource constraints and 
incentivise allocation of resources toward addressing the 
supply constraint or reducing demand. 
Primary and secondary ZERPA transactions
The market operations of both ZERPA markets are illustrated 
in Figure 5. A producer contracts with the intermediary 
in the primary ZERPA auction at time t=0. The contract 
is certified, and the intermediary then immediately 
issues the contract to the secondary market, where it is 
purchased by resource user A. The ZERPA contract binds at 
t=t0, the commissioning date at which the project begins 
delivering zero emissions resources. Delivery is certified by 
the intermediary, and the producer delivers resources and 
certificates to the user while the user transfers the strike 
price to the producer. (The effect of virtual procurement on 
this operation is explored below) A third market operation 
may occur if user A decides to trade out of their ZERPA. 
At this point, t=T, they issue the remainder of the contract 
back to the secondary market and receive the secondary 
market contract price from the purchaser, user B, who then 
trades with the producer. 
Open questions: Volatility
How will ZERPAs be accounted for on companies’ balance 
sheets? 
Should ZERPAs include a reopener clause? 
Contract volatility for resource users
The ZERPA mechanism can and should be designed to 
limit buyers’ exposure to secondary market volatility to 
increase participation. Accounting for contract volatility 
on balance sheets depends on whether the contract is 
held to maturity or available for trade. For corporate PPAs, 
generally held to maturity, accounting practices depend 
on contract features such as how much influence the buyer 
has over the generator’s operation.22 ZERPAs are tradeable 
so will probably be accounted as available for trade. This 
can create significant balance sheet volatility. However, a 
large and liquid market for ZERPAs would likely stimulate a 
healthy market for ZERPA derivatives (similar to the market 
for derivatives of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme) which 
companies can use to hedge secondary market volatility. 
Another potential way to mitigate price-related volatility is 
to include ‘reopener’ clauses into ZERPAs, whereby certain 
parameters of the contracts could be negotiated at pre-
agreed intervals, such as every five years. This would likely 
limit any major, long-term divergences between the ZERPA 
strike price and resource spot prices. 
 
Timing
Initial purchase, t = 0
Procurement, t = {t0, T}






































Figure 5: The operations of the primary and secondary ZERPA market.
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2.3. ZERPAs for each type of 
resource
This proposal spans three resources. In the first instance, it 
will cover non-emitting generation, biomass and negative 
emissions. In future the scheme might be expanded to 
hydrogen (which must be created using these three initial 
ZERPA resources), storage and other resources as demand 
grows. Each resource market has different features; ZERPAs 
contracts will reflect these differences. Two questions 
stand out: will contracts be for virtual or physical 
procurement? How should network costs be allocated 
across counterparties? 
Non-emitting electricity 
The government’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial 
Revolution set a target to quadruple the supply of non-
emitting generation from offshore wind over the next 
decade, and deliver more nuclear power.6  Non-emitting 
electricity will therefore play a substantial role in the UK’s 
low carbon future. However, it is the most complex market 
and has several peculiarities which must be accounted for 
in the design of ZERPA contracts. 
First, electricity is delivered through the transmission 
and distribution networks. The infrastructure required 
to connect generators and users of electricity precludes 
direct contracts for physical delivery between ZERPA 
counterparties as they would be prohibitively expensive. 
To avoid this problem, ZERPAs for non-emitting electricity 
would probably be virtual contracts: physical procurement 
will remain on the wholesale market, and prices will be 
secured by an additional financial settlement between 
counterparties. The physical and financial flows of 
financially settled ZERPAs are illustrated in Figure 6, for 
the example of the electricity market. They are contrasted 
against a physically settled market, such as biomass. The 
payment of ZERPA top ups and strike prices would probably 
be facilitated through a central clearing house. Virtual 
contracts mean that ZERPA holders consume whatever 
is in the generation mix at a given time but pay for clean 
electricity supply. Priority market access compensates 
them for this positive externality.
Second, renewable generation is inherently intermittent, 
producing electricity when the sun is shining or the 
wind is blowing. Other forms of non-emitting electricity 
are dispatchable on demand—known as ‘firm power’—
including nuclear and hydropower. There may be a case 
for separating electricity ZERPAs into intermittent and 
firm contracts. Intermittent contracts could specify the 
delivery of a fixed amount of electricity over a period; 
firm contracts would offer supply at specific times 
and would be more expensive. On the supply side, the 
price differential between intermittent ZERPAs and 
firm ZERPAs would stimulate investment by renewable 
operators into storage options such as batteries. On the 
demand side, the price differential would incentivise 
the flexibility measures that allow users to capitalise 
on cheap renewable electricity when it is available. 
Open questions: Intermittency
Should there be separate ZERPAs for variable non-emitting 
generation (renewables) and firm non-emitting generation 
(nuclear)? 
How will ZERPAs for non-emitting electricity account for 
intermittent generation? 
ZERPAs’  approach to intermittency can draw on the structure 
of renewable CfDs and PPAs. Intermittent generation 
creates two contract risks: ‘volume’ risk, which considers 
the likely output over a period of time, such as a year, and 
‘shape’ risk, which considers the hour-to-hour variability 
Resource market
Timing






































Figure 6: The market flows for financially settled ‘virtual’ ZERPAs versus physically settled ZERPAs
12 | ZERPAs
of demand.23 CfDs do not have any particular volume or 
shape requirements; the government guarantees the price 
of any electricity produced. Under PPAs, corporate users 
often have volume and shape requirements. PPAs may 
therefore specify a minimum output requirement over 
defined periods, or specify arrangements with utilities to 
cover intermittent shortfalls.23 Non-emitting electricity 
ZERPAs can draw on this precedent.  
Finally, the intermittency of renewable generations 
means that the electricity grid will require more 
flexibility infrastructure to balance demand and supply. 
The cost of these measures must be allocated between 
market participants. They are currently funded through 
levies on electricity suppliers. Cost allocation under 
ZERPAs remains an open question; one possibility is 
that the funds generated in initial secondary market 
sales are earmarked for grid flexibility investment. 
Open questions: Flexibility infrastructure




Biomass also plays a key role in the government’s net 
zero transition plans. Delivery is less complicated than 
for non-emitting electricity, but the sector as a whole 
requires more oversight to avoid unsustainable practices. 
Physical biomass products can be delivered using 
existing transport networks, making trade between 
counterparties much more straightforward. As a result, 
ZERPAs for biomass could be physical contracts, meaning 
they would be settled by physical delivery and direct 
payment between producer and user, rather than with a 
financial transfer of the ZERPA top-up. Physical contracts 
remove the need for intermediary trade on the wholesale 




Open questions: Physical or financial 
settlement
Can some ZERPA contracts specify physical delivery rather 
than financial settlement? 
Case study: ZERPA-backed green steel
Developed in collaboration with ArcelorMittal
Steel is a key component in the modern world, used in construction, manufacturing, household appliances and infrastructure. 
It is also a carbon intensive industry. The way forward lies in ‘green steel’, produced in innovative processes using zero 
emissions energy sources such as non-emitting electricity and green hydrogen. ZERPAs offer a way for steel manufacturers 
to secure long-run procurement of these essential resources in the net zero transition. 
ArcelorMittal is Europe’s biggest steelmaker and a leader in decarbonising the industry. However, like any business, they 
are wary of the costs of net zero steelmaking, which they estimate to be between EU15bn and EU40bn. Executive chairman 
Lakshmi Mittal says net zero technologies “will increase the cost of our steel. It is not cheap, and our customers should be 
ready to pay.”26
ArcelorMittal could use ZERPAs to secure the resources necessary for non-emitting steel production. ZERPA-backed steel 
would be certifiably ‘green’: the verification process for resources in the primary market would allow ArcelorMittal to prove 
the current and future carbon neutrality of their steel. Investors can price the strategy in to future profit forecasts and 
customers can distinguish ArcelorMittal’s steel as genuinely non-emitting. 
Any derived instrument should make it clear to consumers that the product is clean steel, to justify higher prices. 
– Stakeholder, ArcelorMittal
Since production is backed by long-run ZERPAs, ArcelorMittal would be able to offer customers long-run procurement 
contracts for zero-emissions steel. These contracts would fund in-house innovation. Establishing the ZERPA mechanism 
would stimulate a tertiary market for derived contracts for ZERPA-backed procurement.  
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Biomass resources face a particular challenge not present 
in other markets: it must be sourced sustainably, to avoid 
negative effects on food crops, land use and biodiversity. 
Biomass ZERPAs must be developed with this in mind, and 
there may a role for the accreditation agency to oversee 
and enforce sustainable practices amongst suppliers. 
Negative emissions
Negative emissions can also be facilitated by physical 
contracts. In some cases, negative emissions technologies 
must be co-located with the emitting process, such 
as for gas or biomass energy with CCS. Other forms of 
negative emissions, such as natural sinks, do not have to 
be physically co-located for meaningful trade. Either way, 
trade can operate with physical ‘delivery’ where delivery 
refers to the process of transporting and storing carbon. 
This will require significant infrastructure. Developing this 
infrastructure is a key goal of the government’s Ten Point 
Plan, and negative emissions ZERPAs will need to consider 
how this infrastructure is funded. Like electricity, the 
revenues from the initial sale of secondary ZERPAs may be 
allocated into a CCS infrastructure fund. 
Negative emissions technologies are relatively new and 
have not yet been commercialised at scale. However they 
are essential components in the current plans of some 
industries. Given the challenges of developing scalable 
CCS24,25, there may be significant unmet demand for 
negative emissions in the 2030s and 2040s. ZERPAs will 
provide investors, energy and climate regulators a sense of 
the scale of reliance on unproven technologies. This can be 
used to evaluate risks if these technologies are unsuccessful 
or slow to mature and stimulate the development of 
alternatives to existing industrial operations. 
2.4. The role of the intermediary 
The success of the ZERPA mechanism depends on three 
features:
1. Coordination: Balancing signals of demand and 
supply to facilitate trade and price revelation. 
2. Risk sharing: Mitigating the risk and volatility involved 
in long-run procurement contracts. 
3. Verification: Accrediting primary contracts to ensure 
high likelihood of project realisation, and verifying 
the delivery of genuinely zero emissions resources 
once delivery begins. 
Where these requirements cannot easily be met by market 
forces, there is a role for a market intermediary. Today’s 
future allocation mechanisms operate both with and 
without an intermediary. Under CfDs, the government acts 
as a counterparty—but the contract is supply-side only. 
PPAs do not usually operate with an intermediary, and 
this contributes to their expense and inconvenience for 
users. The futures market, which trades financial contracts 
for commodities and financial assets, operates via a 
commercial futures exchange that coordinates trade and 
manages risk. 
The intermediary faces three major types of risk. First, 
the risks of contract default by either counterparty. In 
primary ZERPAs, this may occur due to technological 
barriers to deployment, particularly for contracts with long 
commissioning dates and more speculative technologies. 
In secondary ZERPAs, a user might default if they are no 
longer able to use the resource—for example due to 
bankruptcy. Trading mitigates default risk. Second, the 
risk that projects are able to deliver but do not meet the 
contract’s specifications, for example delivering too little 
resource, or a delayed start date. Depending on the market 
structure, it may be the intermediary’s responsibility to 
ensure contract delivery via the wholesale market for these 
project-level risks. Finally, idiosyncratic or policy risks which 
affect both the supply and demand side of the market. 
These include macroeconomic downturns which dampen 
demand, natural disasters which affect market supply, or 
changing legislation. Given the uncertainties of long-run 
contracting, we anticipate that a ZERPA market will require 
an intermediary to provide some form of contract insurance. 
Open questions: Insurance
How much insurance is necessary to secure participation? 
Will insurance create moral hazards that would undermine 
efficient signalling? 
 
Commercial or public intermediaries
The intermediary can be a private company, like the 
futures exchange, or a government body, like the Low 
Carbon Contracts Company which is the CfD counterparty. 
Companies may take on the role of the intermediary where 
there is an opportunity to make a profit on the risk spread 
between primary and secondary contracts. However, 
government may be a more appropriate intermediary if 
market failures are inhibiting the delivery of its overarching 
net zero strategy. In particular, the level of government 
involvement might vary depending on the risk profile of 
particular resources. For example, CCS is key to the Ten 
Point Plan, but a highly risky technology. The government 
may be willing to take on some contract risk for negative 
emissions to facilitate market operations by reducing 
market participants’ exposure to technology risks. This 
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has precedent in large-scale infrastructure projects: the 
UK government took on the sizeable and highly uncertain 
financial responsibility for the long-run storage of nuclear 
power waste to enable safe and efficient operation of the 
commercial nuclear generation market.27 More recently, 
it also provided contingent financial support for several 
types of risk in the construction of the Thames Tideway 
Tunnel Project.28 The government may have a similar role in 
ZERPAs where technology risks are high. Private companies 
may be willing to take on the role of intermediary 
for more established markets where technologies 
are less risky and infrastructure is better developed. 
Open questions: Government’s role
Will the government  act as a contract intermediary, or just 
facilitate auctions and trade? 
Can and should the government mitigate technology risks 
to encourage participation?  
What are the delivery bodies for ZERPA?
  
2.5. Market implications 
Primary ZERPAs will support the growing role of zero 
emissions resources in the UK economy by stimulating 
supply. Secondary ZERPAs will support efficiency by 
generating long-run demand signals. This section 
considers the effect of various market scenarios under 
ZERPAs. 
Temporary shocks to resource supply and 
demand
Under both demand and supply shocks, resource 
constraints bind temporarily. Market supply can no longer 
meet market demand; the priority market access clause 
of ZERPAs is enacted, allowing ZERPA-contracted users 
to secure their supply ahead of non-contracted market 
participants. This then tightens the shortage in the residual 
market for non-ZERPA supply, and increases the wholesale 
market price. These effects are illustrated in Figures 7 and 
8. Figure 7 shows a short-run increase in resource demand, 
such as for electricity during periods of high heating or 
cooling requirements. The increase in demand is coupled 
with a ZERPA-induced supply contraction as ZERPA-
contracted users secure their supply via priority market 
access. Figure 8 illustrates the contrasting effect of a short-
run supply shock, for example if intermittent renewable 
electricity sources are not generating or biomass stocks 
are damaged by a poor harvest. The external shock is then 
exacerbated by the ZERPA-induced supply contraction. 
In an unconstrained economy, the balance between 
demand and supply gives rise to a market equilibrium at 
quantity Q1 and price P1. When the market equilibrium 
increases beyond the resource constraint at Q2, prices 
increase to the constrained price on the wholesale market 
P2. Once resource constraints bind, ZERPA-contracted 
resource claim their allocated supply. Resource users 
who do not hold ZERPA are forced to pay the residual 
scarcity price P3 to secure resources, over and above the 
























































Figure 8: The effect of a supply shock on a resource market 
under ZERPAs
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ZERPA price outcomes in constrained 
resource markets
There are two potential scenarios for future zero emissions 
resource markets. Resource constraints could bind: supply 
will be unable to meet demand and market shortages will 
lead to resource price hikes. Alternatively, supply expansion 
could enable a looser resource market where constraints 
do not bind. As discussed in Section 1, it is probable that 
resource constraints will bind in the transition to net zero. 
ZERPA prices will reflect expectations of future resource 
constraints. In an efficient market with a sizeable share of 
ZERPA-contracted supply, the unconstrained wholesale 
price will converge to the in-year ZERPA strike price (or 
the average strike price), due to the possibility of ongoing 
contract trade on the secondary ZERPA market. This means 
that the price payoff of holding ZERPAs during a supply or 
demand shock is the difference between the constrained 
residual price, P3, and the unconstrained wholesale price 
(or strike price), P1. Non-contracted users pay a residual 
scarcity price premium and may be unable to secure 
resources at all. 
Along with wholesale prices, aggregate resource 
constraints affect contract prices in the ZERPA-secondary 
market. When constraints are binding, the value of holding 
a ZERPA is high and in-year contracts will have a high resale 
value. The opposite is true when resource constraints are 
non-binding. There are therefore two potential scenarios 
for resource markets under a ZERPA mechanism: 
Table 3 summarises the outcomes for each market party 
under binding and non-binding aggregate resource 
constraints. 
Party ZERPA position Outcome
Binding resource constraints: High wholesale resource prices, high ZERPA contract price
Intermediary Counterparty
Contractually bound to buy and sell resources at ZERPA 
strike price. Position perfectly hedged. 
Resource producers
Primary ZERPA contracted
Contractually bound to sell resource below wholesale 
spot price to ZERPA counterparty. 
Not contracted Can sell at high wholesale spot price
Resource users
Secondary ZERPA contracted
Contractual right to buy energy below market value, or 
option to sell ZERPA 
Not contracted Can only buy at high wholesale spot price
Non-binding resource constraints: Low wholesale resource prices, low ZERPA contract price
Intermediary Counterparty
Contractually bound to buy and sell resources at ZERPA 
strike price. Position perfectly hedged.
Resource producers
Primary ZERPA contracted
Contractual right to sell resources above wholesale 
spot price to ZERPA counterparty
Not contracted Can only sell at low wholesale spot price
Resource users
Secondary ZERPA contracted
Contractually bound to buy resources above wholesale 
price. In-year ZERPA resale worthless
Not contracted Can buy at the wholesale spot price
Table 3: Impact of binding and non-binding resource constraints on market participants under ZERPA
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Energy not available when 
contract comes to term
Supplier compensates user if resources 
unavailable or expensive on wholesale 
market 
Output less than predicted
Energy not available when 
contract comes to term
Supplier compensates user if resources 
unavailable or expensive on wholesale 
market
Output more than predicted Oversupply under ZERPA
Additional supply sold to wholesale market 
at wholesale price
Output intermittent 
Short-run supply and 
demand imbalance
Wholesale market pricing and capacity 
mechanisms 
Supplier bankruptcy No supplier
Bankruptcy procedures. Potential role for 
intermediary risk management. 
Supplier reneges on 
agreement
No supplier
Credit rating, law enforcement. Potential 




Buyer bankruptcy No buyer
Buyer can sell ZERPA on secondary 
market. Potential role for intermediary risk 
management.
Buyer renegues on 
agreement
No buyer
Credit rating, law enforcement. Buyer can 
sell ZERPA on secondary market. Potential 
role for intermediary risk management.
Market risks
Energy shortages in 2050 
and all supply committed
Strong incentives to revert 
to fossil fuels
Government regulation for net zero 
resource use (not ZERPA mechanism). 
Mass speculation in inflates 
price 
Distributional impact
Limit access to ZERPA market to those who 
can prove resource needs
Inflation ZERPA value eroded Strike prices set to real value
New legislation bans 
contracted use of resources
ZERPA delivery banned 
Government buys back contracts which 
have been invalidated by new legislation 
Stress testing
Any resource market mechanism must be resilient to 
adverse shocks. Table 4 shows the in-built reactions of 
market participants to adverse shocks which mitigate risk 
under ZERPAs.
Table 4: Stress testing the ZERPA mechanism
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Some aspects of implementation depend on specifics 
of the mechanism which are not prescribed in this 
proposal, such as the role of the intermediary. They can 
be evaluated and ameliorated as the price, demand and 
sectoral uptake of ZERPAs is realised. Implementing the 
mechanism can be undertaken in four steps, illustrated 
in Figure 9. Government procurement could support and 
accelerate the implementation of ZERPAs. The UK public 
sector consumed 18TWh of electricity, 40ktoe of biomass 
and emitted 7.9MtCO2 in 201929,30. Government could 
purchase secondary ZERPA contracts to secure their own 
supply of zero emissions resources. This would establish 
a ZERPA contract price and increase liquidity in the 
secondary market. 
Protecting vulnerable resource users
Mitigating the distributional impacts of resource scarcity 
will also require government intervention. Current policy 
protects essential services such as hospitals from demand 
disconnection during blackouts31. A similar scheme may 
be used in a resource market under ZERPAs, whereby 
the government secures resource allocation for essential 
sites. Another way to mitigate the impact of high scarcity 
prices on non-ZERPA-contracted users may be to earmark 
a certain portion of production for non-ZERPA sale. 
Ensuring affordable energy for consumers is a key priority 
for government. As resource constraints tighten, additional 
support will be required for vulnerable citizens who may 
face higher prices for energy and consumer goods. Power 
price increases are regressive, placing a heavy burden 
on poor households who spend a higher share of their 
income on these products32. This effect was seen after the 
implementation of carbon pricing33. The government has a 
role to reduce harm, building on existing policies that limit 
electricity prices and lump-sum charges for vulnerable 
customers. Policies to counteract potential negative 
distributional effects of resource constraints should tackle 
them directly, either by supporting vulnerable resource 
users or adjusting social benefit payments to reflect higher 
living costs. This avoids distorting the aggregate market 
signals of scarcity and demand which will incentivise the 
transition to zero emissions resources. 
The potential for international ZERPA market
As global climate ambition—and climate financial risk 
management—grows, the ZERPA scheme can be expanded. 
ZERPAs could be implemented in individual countries, 
at a level of ambition commensurate with that country’s 
climate targets. Linking international ZERPA markets could 
increase participation and market liquidity. Because they 
capitalise on commercial incentives for price security 
and climate commitments, ZERPAs will sidestep some of 
the problems faced by the alternative policy of carbon 
taxation, which generates incentives to shift production—
and emissions—offshore to avoid the tax. Some carbon 
pricing schemes operate across multiple markets, such 
as the EU and UK Emissions Trading Schemes, and may 





Government announces ZERPA: One year ahead of the first ZERPA primary market auction and two years before first 
secondary market issuance, to allow producers, users and investors to plan and prepare. 
First ZERPA primary market auction: Run similarly to current CfD auctions, with some auction design adjustments 
to support distant   contracting. Capacity and budget caps should be consistent with current CfD auctions. This will 
be the first auction available for biomass and negative emissions bidders. Successful bidders will be reviewed by the 
accreditation agency. 
ZERPAs issued to the secondary market: Contracts made available on a central exchange. Profits from the initial 
issuance accrue to the auction agency to cover costs. Secondary market trade is ongoing.
Ongoing primary auctions and secondary trade: After the first secondary market issuance, demand and prices will 
be used to guide the capacity and budget caps for future primary auctions. As more contracts are issued to the market 
and financial pressure for ZERPA-backed climate plans increases, secondary market interest will grow, potentially 
attracting speculators and other investors.   
Figure 9: Proposed timeline to implementation of ZERPAs.
3.  Establishing ZERPAs as part of the UK’s  
climate strategy
Rolling out the ZERPA mechanism in the UK can be undertaken as an extension of today’s CfD 
auctions. The first round will indicate secondary demand for ZERPA contracts. 
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4. ZERPAs, climate policy and other  
mechanisms
Various alternative mechanisms might support the transition to a net zero economy and facilitate 
the efficient allocation of resources and capital. They can be classed into policy-supported market 
mechanisms and direct interventions, shown in Table 5. 
 
Zero emissions resource allocation comes under market 
mechanisms, and would be a form of climate policy. 
ZERPAs build on the policies to stimulate innovation 
and deployment of low carbon technologies to meet 
the government’s Ten Point Plan. For companies and 
shareholders, they offer tradeable contracts for long-
run supply and price certainty, as well as verification of 
corporate net zero plans. Unlike common direct climate 
interventions such as carbon pricing or regulations, 
ZERPAs are aligned with commercial incentives for the 
climate transition. 
4.1. ZERPAs through the lens of 
climate policy
The UK government has four guiding principles for 
transforming the power sector, summarised by Business 
Secretary Greg Clark in 2018:34
1. Market: wherever possible use market mechanisms 
that take full advantage of innovation and competition 
2. Insurance: given intrinsic uncertainty about the 
future, government must be prepared to intervene to 
provide insurance and preserve optionality 
3. Agility: energy regulation must be agile and 
responsive if it is to reap the great opportunities of 
the smart, digital economy, and finally 
4. No free-riding: consumers of all types should pay a 
fair share of system costs
These four principles can be extended easily to include all 
zero emissions resources. They aim to deliver a low-cost, 
low-carbon, and secure energy system for the net zero 
transition, and can be used to evaluate policy proposals. 
Table 6 compares five possible allocation mechanisms 
under the four principles. 
CfDs, carbon pricing and EMR have all been proposed 
or implemented as valuable energy market strategies 
in the pathway to net zero; indeed they all satisfy the 
four principles to some extent. ZERPAs also satisfy the 
four principles while offering three additional benefits: 
accounting for future aggregate resource constraints; 
establishing a tool to verify companies’ climate strategies; 
and covering all three zero emissions resources. These 
benefits will be crucial in the path to net zero.
Market mechanisms Direct interventions
• ZERPAs: Long-term price agreements between 
resource users and producers. 
• Futures market: Buyers, sellers and speculators trade 
contracts for products traded in the future. 
• Electricity market reform (EMR): Redesign electricity 
markets so prices cover capital costs rather than based 
on short-run marginal costs. 
• Project financing model: Risk sharing across investors  
• CfDs: Guaranteed future price support for renewable 
generation, allocated and funded by government.  
• Carbon pricing: Increase price of emitting products 
compared to non-emitting substitutes. 
• Regulations: Set requirements for companies to 
procure a set share of zero emissions resources.
• Innovation funds: Government funds for low-carbon 
research and development.  
Table 5: Potential market mechanisms to allocate future resources
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CfDs) to support 
optionality.  













































4.2. Review of alternative resource 
pricing mechanisms
Three alternative mechanisms for long-run pricing and 
allocation of resources exist and have been mentioned 
throughout this report. They could operate over distant 
time horizons, and address several different types of price 
risk. This section provides more detail on each alternative; 
Section 4.3 compares them to the proposed ZERPA 
mechanism.     
Any future allocation mechanism will specify a long-
run delivery price for resources, thereby eliminating the 
risks associated with fluctuating prices. For example, 
falling electricity prices will reduce generators’ revenue, 
known as ‘merchant risk’, while benefitting users as their 
energy costs decline. The opposite is true as prices rise. 
Mechanisms which specify long-run prices eliminate 
merchant risk, which is usually a requirement for securing 
the loans necessary to finance new resource projects. 
Energy users also hedge their prices. The downside of price 
security is that neither party can benefit from any upside 
price fluctuations. If prices fall, users face an opportunity 
cost of price hedging as their non-contracted competitors 
Table 6: Comparing mechanisms under the four principles
benefit from lower prices. However, this opportunity 
cost is generally seen as an acceptable tradeoff for price 
security—particularly given the uncertainty in electricity 
markets over the coming decades. 
Contracts for Difference
Public sector stimulus for zero emissions resources focuses 
on renewable electricity generation through CfDs, which 
guarantee a fixed price for electricity over a 15-year 
period. They are allocated in auctions run by National Grid. 
Separate auctions for different technologies ensure that 
nascent technologies stand a chance of getting contracts. 
National Grid sets a budget cap, maximum capacity and a 
maximum price for each auction, and bidders are required 
to fulfil a number of pre-qualification criteria, including 
grid connection agreements and spatial planning permits. 
CfD auctions are pay-as-clear, or uniform price, which 
means winners all receive the strike price of the highest 
winning bid. Under a CfD, generators continue to sell 
electricity on the wholesale market at the wholesale 
spot price. Price hedging is facilitated by the transfer of a 
variable ‘top up’ between buyers and producers, illustrated 
in Figure 10. 
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CfDs achieve swift increases in capacity compared to other 
renewables policies, but are expensive for governments.35. 
The capacity of awarded contracts has grown in successive 
allocation rounds, indicating strong market interest in 
price support mechanisms for resource suppliers.36 
Corporate power purchasing agreements 
Corporate PPAs are private-sector electricity supply 
agreements, usually brokered between electricity 
generators and users for delivery at an agreed price over 
several years. PPAs can be ‘virtual’, where each party still 
operates via the electricity grid and the contract specifies 
a financial transfer to mimic direct payment at the agreed 
price, or ‘physical’, where the generator directly supplies 
electricity to the user. 
There is rising interest in PPAs, particularly for renewable 
electricity sources.23 In 2015, PPAs totalling 3.8GW were 
signed; by 2020, they totalled 24.5GW.37 Delivery prices 
have simultaneously fallen. The growth of PPAs signals 
both the growing interest in corporate sustainability and 
concerns over access to clean energy.37 However, PPAs are 
costly to negotiate and tend to be agreed only by large 
corporations. 
PPAs can be difficult for smaller players to negotiate, which 
creates barriers to the participation of small to medium-
sized enterprises in the corporate PPA market. Getting them 
involved would be great.
 – Energy investment expert, International Energy Agency
Addressing resource constraints across the whole 
economy will require a more standardised and less 
complex mechanism. The mechanism proposed here will 
draw on the growing demand for PPAs, while making them 







When the market (spot) price is 
below the contract’s strike price, 
a top -up is paid to producers
When the market (spot) price is above 
the strike price, the producer pays the 
dierence back to the buyer
Figure 10: Financial transactions in Contracts for Difference
Futures markets
Futures markets are a commercial allocation mechanism 
where parties trade medium-term contracts for the future 
delivery of commodities or financial assets. Contracts 
are traded at a centralised exchange and standardised in 
size and duration. Futures contracts enable hedging to 
secure prices, and speculation by professional traders who 
bet on futures price fluctuations. Most futures contracts 
are financially settled: a financial transaction avoids the 
inconvenience and infrastructure of physical delivery 
between geographically dispersed counterparties. 
Futures exchanges manage price risk by requiring a ‘margin 
account’, a cash collateral that is settled daily based on 
changes in the futures price between contract agreement 
and expiry. Daily maintenance of the margin account can 
become very expensive when the future price fluctuates 
heavily. Constant margin payments during periods of high 
market volatility negates some of the price hedging value 
of futures. Contracts are rarely offered more than two or 
three years in advance, meaning they have little value 
for long-term resource allocation. There are a number 
of contracts available for the delivery of UK electricity, 
though not non-emitting electricity specifically, and for 
some limited forms of biomass.
4.3. Comparison to existing 
mechanisms
Table 7 compares the ZERPA mechanism to CfDs, PPAs and 
futures markets across a number of dimensions. 
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Table 7: Features of ZERPA markets compared to existing resource allocation mechanisms







Generator - User Buyer - Seller









Trade Secondary exchange None None Futures exchange
Supply-side incentives Revenue certainty; 
access to project 
financing.
Revenue certainty; 
access to project 
financing. 
Revenue certainty; 





Price and supply 
security; credible 
climate signal.
No demand side 
participation. 







Share of pledges 
covered by ZERPA 
purchases. 
Analytics only Share of power covered 





Contract size Project; share of 
project 
Project Project; share of project Standardised 
contracts
Duration 15-30 years 15 years >10 years in UK <5 years
Commissioning Projects can have near 
or distant delivery 
dates
Projects typically 
start 2-4 years after 
auction
Delivery or construction 
usually begins soon 
after contracting
Typically only viable 
2-3 years ahead
Settlement Physical or financial Financial Physical or financial Largely financial
Price




Price determination Strike: Primary auction 
Contract: Secondary 
market
CfD auction Wholesale spot price 
expectations
Futures market
Price restrictions Long term purchase 
price set
Long term supply 
price set
Long term price set (can 
be indexed)
Prices set by market
Price signals of future 
shortages
ZERPA contract unit 
price > strike price
Analytics only No market aggregation Futures price > 
current spot price
Risk management







Contract enforcement Credit rating, margin 
payments, law 
enforcement




Large users only, due to 





ZERPAs are a novel market mechanism. They would build on existing capabilities amongst regulators, 
government delivery bodies and commercial contract exchanges. However, just like the net zero 
challenge itself, ZERPAs pose unique challenges including market risk management and cost sharing. 




How will ZERPAs be accounted for on companies’ balance 
sheets? 
Accounting practices determine secondary market volatility 
affects buyers’ balance sheets. Volatility accounting should 
reflect the liability of a company to future downside risks 
in particular. Accounting for ZERPAs will build on existing 
methods for measuring liability under PPAs and financial 
instruments such as future contracts. 
Should ZERPAs include a reopener clause? 
Including a reopener clause would mean contracts could be 
adjusted for changing market conditions, and ZERPA strike 
prices would be unlikely to diverge hugely from the market 
spot price. This would reduce volatility and potentially 
increase their appeal to counterparties. However, it would 
also reduce their forecasting power, the certainty they 
offer to ‘price’ future climate commitments, and their 
standardisation. 
Intermittency
Should there be separate ZERPAs for variable non-emitting 
generation (renewables) and firm non-emitting generation 
(nuclear)? 
The need for two different types of non-emitting electricity 
will depend on the development of flexibility and storage 
infrastructure. Price differential for different types of 
non-emitting electricity would stimulate innovation and 
deployment of flexibility mechanisms, but would make 
ZERPAs less standardised. 
How will ZERPAs for non-emitting electricity account for 
intermittent generation? 
Lessons can be taken from corporate PPAs. Common 
contract clauses include a minimum delivery requirement, 
which is then facilitated by intraday trading during periods 
of low generation. 
Flexibility infrastructure
How much should ZERPA counterparties pay for market 
infrastructure? 
Markets require infrastructure to facilitate trade. This 
is especially true for non-emitting electricity and 
negative emissions. System costs must be share amongst 
participants; ZERPAs may be able to facilitate this using 
the revenue generated from initial issuance of contracts 




Can some ZERPA contracts specify physical delivery rather 
than financial settlement?
Settlement will depend on the type of resource and features 
of the market. Where physical settlement is easily available, 
this will probably be preferrable because links between 
supply and procurement will be easier to verify. Biomass 
and negative emissions face lower barriers to physical 
settlement, which may be preferrable in these markets.  
Insurance
How much ZERPA contract risk can be insured by 
government? 
ZERPAs are proposed as a key mechanism to achieving 
UK targets for net zero, so the government may have a 
significant role in delivering the scheme. To facilitate market 
participation and overcome the market failures which 
currently inhibit trade, they may elect to take on some 
contract risk. 
How much insurance is necessary to secure participation? 
The amount of insurance or risk sharing necessary to 
achieve market participation must be determined as 
implementation progresses. The market should be designed 
with these incentives and risks in mind. 
Will insurance create moral hazards that would undermine 
efficient signalling?
Insuring contract risk increases the ‘option value’ of entering 
into contracts: with little downside risk, producers and users 
will be more likely to enter into contracts which they are 
not certain they can fulfil. The need for insurance to increase 
liquidity must be balanced against moral hazards which 
could distort incentives and participation. 
Government’s role
Will the government  act as a contract counterparty/
intermediary, or just facilitate auctions and trade?
Viability of a commercial counterparty depends on the level 
of risk that a counterparty must take on. Government may 
have a role where technology/market is highly risky, or 
where market failures inhibit trade.
Can and should the government mitigate technology risks 
to encourage participation?  
High technology risk could detract from the value of ZERPAs 
for companies. The government therefore may have a role to 
take on some of the liability of contracts in order to increase 
participation, similar to their role in the large and uncertain 
liability for decommissioning nuclear power plants. 
What are the delivery bodies for ZERPAs? 
The delivery bodies for ZERPA will depend on the 
government’s role in the market. The current delivery 
bodies for Contracts for Difference involve National Grid and 
three government owned companies who act as contract 
counterparties and oversight bodies. The same structure 
could be utilised for ZERPAs. Involvement of a commercial 
intermediary may make a different structure more desirable. 
Table 8: Open questions for implementation of the ZERPA mechanism
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